Introduction

In 1976, 16 years after the establishment of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) , the organisation endeavoured to develop what is said to be one of the world's most authoritative international corporate responsibility instruments, 1 better known as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNE Guidelines).
2 The MNE Guidelines 3 were -and are still -regarded as recommendations, addressed by governments to multinational enterprises (MNEs) and contain voluntary 4 principles and standards that stimulate responsible business conduct.
5 Effective implementation of the MNE Guidelines is supported by National Contact Points (NCPs). A total of 47 NCPs help promote the MNE Guidelines and offer their good offices to help resolve disputes that arise within the ambit of the guidelines. Legality (i. e. the legal validity of rules) has been a central issue connected to the MNE Guidelines and NCPs since their inception. From the very outset, some advisory bodies to the OECD have underlined the importance of transforming the MNE Guidelines into legal rules, 7 which has been reiterated more recently by scholars and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 8 and attempts have been made to move away from guidelines that are merely »morally binding«.
9 By being partly grounded in international law, the MNE Guidelines may transcend their moral boundaries and may have a more compelling (legal) status than anticipated. In a similar vein, the implementation mechanism of the MNE Guidelines, the NCPs, originally did not have any legal status. History shows us how the NCPs have evolved, as their legal status changed drastically.
In the literature, a historical analysis of the MNE Guidelines and NCPs has been lacking. No extant research probes into the legality of the MNE Guidelines and NCPs since their inception. This article aims to address this gap in the literature by comprehensively discussing the history of the MNE Guidelines and the NCPs. It chronologically describes and analyses the evolution of the MNE Guidelines and the NCPs from a legal-historical perspective. Examples will illustrate how the OECD and the courts have grappled with the multinormativity of the MNE Guidelines. The primary objective of this article is to establish the legality of the MNE Guidelines and the NCPs to provide clarity once and for all. The main research question that will be answered in this article is: what is the legal status of the MNE Guidelines and the NCPs?
In order to answer the main research question, I have performed a secondary data analysis 10 of policy documents and conference reports of the OECD.
11 In addition, extensive research into the literature and an analysis of (semi-legal) documents, such as conventions, court decisions and semi-legal decisions were conducted. Research included documents from all stakeholders to add depth to the analysis. The bulk of the analysis concentrated on historical documents.
The remainder of section 1 briefly offers some necessary background information on the institu-tional structure of the OECD (section 1.2). The ensuing three sections of this article demarcate a certain period in the (legal) development of the NCPs and the MNE Guidelines: the inception of the guidelines in the mid-1970s (section 2), the dormancy of the NCPs through the 1980s and 1990s (section 3), and their reinvigoration after 2000 (section 4). The final two sections investigate the apparently changing legal status of the MNE Guidelines within the purview of some (recent) legislative developments (section 5) and answer the main research question (section 6).
The Institutional Structure of the OECD
The Council, Secretariat, Investment
Committee and the WPRBC The OECD's organisational structure comprises three main bodies that can be further broken down into manifold sub-entities. The three main bodies are: (i) the Council, (ii) the Secretariat and (iii) the committees. The Council, which oversees the whole OECD, provides strategic guidance and decides on key policy issues.
12 Orders of the Council are executed by the Secretariat. 13 The OECD also has 250 committees, working groups and expert groups that develop ideas and review the progress that has been made by the Secretariat in specific areas.
14 The Investment Committee is one of the 250 committees and is formally responsible for overseeing the functioning of the MNE Guidelines and clarifying their meaning.
15 Another formal task of the Investment Committee is to report periodically to the Council on issues covered by the MNE Guidelines.
16 Formal tasks of the Investment Committee were delegated to the Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct (WPRBC) in 2013. The WPRBC was established under the Investment Committee as one of its five official subsidiary bodies and is tasked with enhancing the effectiveness of the MNE Guidelines.
Ever since its advent, the WPRBC has been the primary OECD body engaged in the development of the NCPs and the MNE Guidelines.
17
Figure 1: Organisational structure with the NCPs placed within the OECD framework 18
The NCPs and OECD advisory bodies
The NCPs can be located in the broader institutional structure of the OECD (see Figure 1) . They promote the MNE Guidelines, assist MNEs to take appropriate measures to implement the guidelines and provide mediation and conciliation services to resolve any (potential) disputes that may arise in the light of the guidelines.
19 The NCPs are regarded as a pivotal element of the functioning of the MNE Guidelines 20 and are regarded as one of the main contributors to the effectiveness of the guidelines. 21 The NCPs purportedly play an indispensable role in providing justice and remedy for those affected by the actions of MNEs.
22 Currently, an NCP exists (at least on paper) in each OECD member state, including 13 non-member adhering states.
23 NCPs are allowed to work together with the OECD advisory bodies representing the business community, trade unions and NGOs. The three formally recognised advisory bodies are the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC), the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC) and OECD Watch. 
The Legal Status of the MNE Declaration
The Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD Convention) enumerates the OECD's repertoire of (non-)legislative instruments. The OECD can take decisions, make recommendations and enter into agreements. All instruments are directed at states and international organisations, but they do not address private actors, such as MNEs.
32 The former chair of the drafting group of the MNE Guidelines,Theo Vogelaar, stumbled on this flaw in the OECD Convention when he tried to draft guidelines for MNEs. In an attempt to address MNEs, Vogelaar decided to use an instrument that had not been included in the OECD's repertoire of instruments: the declaration. Because declarations are not available to the OECD as formal instruments, Vogelaar argued that the MNE Declaration was established by governments representing their own states and not by governments representing the OECD. In other words, the MNE Declaration was not a typical OECD instrument. In order to restore the link to the OECD, the implementation of the MNE Declaration was entrusted to it.
33 As was shown in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, this link was restored through the creation of the Investment Committee, the WPRBC, the three advisory committees and NCPs, which monitor the implementation of the MNE Declaration.
The MNE Guidelines
Contents and Scope
After the 1976 MNE Guidelines and their slightly amended 1979 version 34 came into force, they were celebrated as a remarkable step forward in the development of a generally accepted code of conduct for MNEs 35 and seen as a solid achievement for »free world diplomacy«. 36 The MNE Guidelines carried great significance, being the first intergovernmental voluntary code of conduct involving developed countries.
37 The spotless reception of the MNE Guidelines was lightly tainted by a number of critical remarks made by the TUAC. The TUAC contended that not much had changed 33 Vogelaar (1980 ) 132-133. 34 The MNE Guidelines were amended in 1979 , 1984 , 1991 , 2000 , OECD (1979b OECD (1984a) ; OECD (1991a); OECD (2000a); OECD (2011d). 35 Hägg (1984) . 36 Davidow (1977) 455. 37 421, 427-428.
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Sander van 't Foort since the introduction of the MNE Guidelines, that workers were still unaware of their existence and that legal rules were necessary.
38 Notwithstanding these critical remarks, the OECD's initiative to develop the MNE Guidelines was considered a milestone in the international regulatory process.
39
The MNE Guidelines originally centred on the manufacturing industry 40 and comprised seven chapters dealing with general policies, disclosure of information, competition, 41 financing, taxation, employment and industrial relations, and science and technology. The subjects of human rights, consumer interests, the environment and bribery, 42 main themes of future editions of the MNE Guidelines (see section 4), did not receive any or barely any attention in the 1976 edition. The 1979 revision of the MNE Guidelines did not bring about any substantial changes, just a minor textual update of one of the provisions of the employment and industrial relations chapter.
43 Due to the minor progress made, the TUAC concluded that a »virtual stalemate« was reached regarding the contents of the MNE Guidelines. 
The Legal Status of the MNE Guidelines
From the outset, the MNE Guidelines were formulated as recommendations from governments jointly given to MNEs operating in their territories. Eyk (1995) 121-122, 135; Blanpain (2004) 9. For the moral obligatory nature of codes of conduct in general and the MNE Guidelines specifically, see : Hofstetter / Klubeck (1986) 484-486; Getz (1990) 567-577; N.T. (1978) 255-256; Frederick (1991 ) 165-177. 48 OECD (1982 . 50 
57
The review and consultation procedures would, rather, function as a more neutral »follow-up« mechanism.
58 According to the Investment Committee, the procedures served as a platform to discuss individual cases in the abstract, without reaching any conclusion about individual cases. Individual cases were transformed into »hypothet-ical problems« that needed clarification in the light of the provisions of the MNE Guidelines.
59
The review and consultation procedures were of practical importance, because they induced the settlements of individual cases by clarifying whether actions of MNEs in general complied with the MNE Guidelines.
60 Based on these generalisations, MNEs involved in a specific clarification procedure could still ascertain whether their actions were in accordance with the MNE Guidelines. As such, the review and consultation procedures, as laid down in the IGCP Decision, converted the MNE Guidelines into a more compelling instrument 61 and seemed to function de facto as a platform that stimulated dispute resolution.
The MNE Guidelines as Clarified by the Investment Committee and Applied by Domestic Courts
The Badger Case
The 1977 Badger case is a »historic landmark case« 62 that garnered extensive attention in the literature, 63 as it set an important precedent for future cases and was the first case in which the MNE Guidelines were (successfully) invoked.
64
In January 1977, the individual labour contracts of approximately 250 Badger employees were terminated. After being declared bankrupt by the Antwerp Commercial Tribunal, 65 Badger was unable to indemnify its employees for the termination of their contracts, and its US-based parent company, Badger Inc., refused to pay the debts of its Belgian subsidiary. 66 In Belgium, indemnification rates were the highest in the world, and Belgian regulations allowed for indemnification of the outstanding amounts by a social insurance fund. On the instigation of the trade unions, it was decided not to claim indemnification via the social insurance fund, but to bring the case before the Antwerp District Court and the Investment Committee. After consultation with the Investment Committee, the parties reached an agreement, whereupon the case before the court was terminated. 67 Badger Inc., which most likely could not be held liable for any indemnification according to the prevailing laws in this case, 68 agreed to indemnify all 198 of the approximately 250 staff members of its Belgian subsidiary for the closure. It also agreed to pay a maximum of 120 million Belgian francs. 69 Two years later, the Investment Commit-54 OECD (1976) Annex I, Par. 11. 55 Vogelaar (1977) 7; Kauzlarich (1981 ) 1015 -1016 , 1027 -1028 . 56 Vogelaar (1980 cil was qualified as grave negligence on the side of BATCO and a violation of the principle of good governance. The court concluded that closing one of its manufacturing facilities constituted mismanagement of BATCO.
82
What makes the BATCO case exceptional is that it is the first case recorded in which the MNE Guidelines were applied in court. At an annual general meeting of shareholders, the chairman of BATCO's UK-based parent company, BATCO Industries, publicly announced that the MNE Guidelines »are very much in line with our own established policies in these matters and we certainly support their efforts to have them widely applied«. 83 The Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal implicitly bound BATCO to the MNE Guidelines through this unilateral declaration of BATCO Industries' chairman.
84 It ruled that it is not without meaning that BATCO endorsed the MNE Guidelines, 85 which prescribe cooperation with stakeholders during collective lay-offs.
86
The Dutch courts were reluctant to reach any conclusions on the legal status of the MNE Guidelines 87 or to pass any judgement on the clarifications of the Investment Committee regarding the BATCO case that had been discussed at a Council meeting only a few days earlier.
88 The President of the Amsterdam District Court purportedly declined to address the allegation of the plaintiff that the MNE Guidelines had been violated, presumably because he considered the MNE Guidelines to be voluntary and not binding on companies.
89
3 The Dormant Period of the NCPs (1980 NCPs ( -1999 
Clarifications of the Investment Committee and Opinions of the NCPs
The Philips III Case
What makes the Philips III case extraordinary is that it is the first case that was actively dealt with by an NCP. Just a year after the Investment Committee recommended the instalment of NCPs by states, thus before installing NCPs became mandatory, the Finnish NCP had already given its first opinion. In 1980, the case was submitted by the TUAC at the national level (i. e. the Finnish NCP) and at the international level (i. e. the Investment Committee). The case involved the closure of a subsidiary of Philips in Finland, Oy Philips Ab. Philips allegedly had not properly informed its employees or the local management of Oy Philips Ab. Employees of Oy Philips Ab were notified that production would be terminated and, during the same meeting, which lasted less than two hours, employees had to sign minutes that stated that negotiations had taken place.
99
The Finnish NCP acknowledged that the employees had been confronted with a fait accompli. According to the Finnish NCP, notice of the plant closure was given well in advance, and steps were taken to mitigate adverse effects, but the decision had been taken before any notification. Because the decision regarding the closure had already taken place before any notification, the Finnish NCP argued that negotiations with employees were effectively superfluous. In its opinion, the Finnish NCP criticised the Dutch headquarters of Philips with respect to their communications towards employees and the local management. The Finnish NCP concluded that it »is not convinced that the parent company has fulfilled the recommendation set up by the OECD Guidelines«.
100 In stark contrast to the opinion of the Finnish NCP, the Investment Committee decided that no clarification of the MNE Guidelines was necessary in this case.
101
Another reason why the Phillips III case is extraordinary is that, for the first time in NCP history, the fundamental question arose as to whether NCPs could reach a conclusion on the conduct of an individual enterprise. Reaching conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises is now succinctly termed as »making determinations« and is still subject to intense debate.
102
In the Phillips III case, the Finnish NCP reached a conclusion on the conduct of Phillips, hence being the first NCP to make a determination.
The 1991 Revision
The 1990s were characterised by an increased role of (information) 
NCPs Out of the Limelight
An emerging issue already signalled in the early 1980s and deemed »gigantic« by the former diplomat and representative of the Belgian government Roger Blanpain was the »promotional problem«. Efforts to promote the NCPs and the MNE Guidelines needed to be augmented, or else obscurity could pose a serious threat to their existence.
110
This promotional problem was compounded by the infrequent use of the NCPs during the 1990s.
111 Debates and disputes on the application of the MNE Guidelines, a necessary prerequisite to keep the guidelines active, 112 rarely took place at the NCP level.
113 The interest of, especially, the trade unions in NCPs, the prominence of the MNE Guidelines and the clarification procedures of the Investment Committee declined during the 1990s. In the 1980s, a flurry of cases had been presented to the Investment Committee by trade unions; some accounts estimate more than 40, whilst only four cases were brought before the Investment Committee a decade later.
114 The voluntary character of the MNE Guidelines probably played a role in trade unions' declining interests.
115 In 1999, the TUAC concluded that the MNE Guidelines were »no longer used and little known«.
116 The MNE Guidelines »slumped into disuse«. 
The 2000 Revolution
Contents and Scope
In multiple ways, the 2000 update of the MNE Guidelines can be considered revolutionary.
118 In 2000, the world was a different place, marked by a growing service and knowledge economy as well as an increase of small-and medium-sized enterprises in international markets.
119 A significant overhaul of the MNE Guidelines 120 was necessary to match the changing global environment and to maintain their relevance and effectiveness.
121
The 2000 update of the MNE Guidelines brought about far-reaching changes.
122 The entire preface of the guidelines was rearranged, modified and divided into a preface and a chapter on »con-cepts and principles«, now mentioning NCPs 105 Tapiola (1999) with the criteria of visibility, accessibility, transparency and accountability. 145 Furthermore, the terms »specific instance« became fashionable and were henceforth used to specify the (mediation or conciliation) procedure used to resolve any disputes pertaining to the implementation of the MNE Guidelines. With the introduction of specific instances, the role of the NCPs in dealing with individual cases was further formalised.
146
The Post-Revolution Period
Reception of the Revised MNE Guidelines
After the 2000 revolution, the MNE Guidelines and their implementation mechanism blossomed. A ground-swell of cases was brought for consideration before the NCPs. By 2004, 64 specific instances were filed in 21 different countries, and only one specific instance was forwarded to the Investment Committee. In contrast to the period before the 2000 review, parties initiating a specific instance now found starting a procedure »worth the expense«, and incidentally the MNE Guidelines were lauded as being »extremely successful«.
147 Johnston, former Secretary-General of the OECD, emphasised the naming and shaming possibilities of the MNE Guidelines and the NCPs, dubbed »the court of public opinion«. Via shareholder meetings or consumer action the »court of public opinion« could wield great power over parties that did not respect the MNE Guidelines. Without undermining the role of the court of public opinion, Johnston, however, conceded that »it would be naïve to think that a meaningful system of global norms could exist without binding regulation and formal deterrence«. 
The 2011 Review
Contents and Scope
By 2011, the Internet economy had expanded, the service and knowledge-intensive sectors were playing an increasingly important role in international markets, and MNEs domiciled in developing countries emerged as key international investors.
149 The time had come to update the MNE Guidelines once again in order to keep pace with the changing world.
150 During this latest update, the MNE Guidelines and MNE Decision reinforced the position of the NCPs, presented a new chapter and incorporated a number of minute but sometimes substantial changes.
151
One of the most significant amendments of the MNE Guidelines was the introduction of a humanrights chapter and the strengthening of humanrights provisions throughout the guidelines. Riskbased due diligence on matters covered by the MNE Guidelines in order to address potential adverse impacts was another novelty. 152 The scope of the risk-based due diligence was not confined to the activities of the MNE itself, but was extended to its supply chain.
153 Finally, by incorporating a new provision in the MNE Guidelines, the investmentnexus problem was overcome.
154 In the 2000 edition of the MNE Guidelines, MNEs were supposed to merely encourage business partners to act responsibly in compliance with them. Since the 2011 revision, MNEs are recommended to prevent and mitigate potential adverse impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products and services by their business relationships.
155 It was this new stipulation that laid a direct link between the operations, products and services of a company and its business relationships, for which an MNE is now supposed to assume responsibility. Ever since the latest update of the MNE Guidelines, MNEs 155 The investment nexus decision was based on Recommendation II.10 (now: Recommendation II.13).
Since the updated version of the MNE Guidelines came into force Recommendation II.13 became a fallback clause. Hitherto, Recommendation II.12 is the chief supply chain clause. OECD (2011e) Chapter II, Para. 12-13.
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NCPs
The procedural guidance for the NCPs was also updated in 2011. The overarching purpose of governments when setting up the NCPs was and remains to further the effectiveness of the MNE Guidelines.
156 Within the boundaries of this overarching purpose, the Council bolstered the dispute-resolution mechanism of the MNE Guidelines by introducing a number of guiding principles.
157 When resolving issues through specific instances, NCPs will have to take into account the following principles: impartiality, predictability, equitability and compatibility with the principles and standards of the MNE Guidelines.
158 The four principles aim to ensure that issues are resolved impartially, that NCPs provide »clear and publicly available information on their role«, including timeframes of the specific instance procedure, that parties can engage in the specific instance procedure on an equal footing without one party dominating it, and that NCPs act within the ambit of the MNE Guidelines. Exemplary for how decisions of NCPs can be interwoven with those of the courts is the PSA Peugeot Citroen case. The issuers in this specific instance, Amicus and T&G, referred to as the »unions« by the UK NCP, alleged that PSA Peugeot Citroen failed to engage in meaningful consultations with the unions when they closed down a manufacturing factory in the UK. The NCP concluded that PSA Peugeot Citroen had given reasonable notice before the factory was closed, but »failed to fulfil all the requirements under the [MNE] Guidelines«.
160
PSA Peugeot Citroen should have consulted the unions when the closure decision was still at a »formative stage« and was supposed to have furnished the unions with sufficient information in order to enable them to engage in the consultations appropriately.
161
In order to interpret the MNE Guidelines' recommendation on the consultation of, and cooperation with, workers and worker representatives by an employer, 162 the UK NCP applied UK case law about fair consultations. UK case law established a number of elements of fair consultations and defined it as »giving the body consulted a fair and proper opportunity to understand fully the matters about which it is being consulted, and to express its views on those subjects«.
163 Based on this definition and its elements, the UK NCP applied UK case law in its own decision and decided that PSA Peugeot Citroen had failed to meet the requirements on fair consultations.
164
Literally copying from UK case law, the UK NCP concluded its decision by recommending the MNE meet the legally defined requirements on fair consultations. since they reflect both soft law and hard law. 167 In other words, the provisions of the MNE Guidelines are considered as soft law, but these soft-law provisions sometimes also reflect matters that are covered by (inter)national rules of hard law.
168
The latest update clearly demarcates these boundaries between the MNE Guidelines as soft law on the one hand and hard law on the other. The MNE Guidelines reiterate that »some matters covered by the [MNE] Guidelines may also be regulated by national law or international commitments« 169 and state that, in case national legislation already exists, »the [MNE] Guidelines are not a substitute for nor should they be considered to override domestic law and regulation«.
170 Whenever domestic laws and the MNE Guidelines conflict with each other, the MNE Guidelines stipulate that »enterprises should seek ways to honour such principles and standards to the fullest extent which does not place them in violation of domestic law«. 171 In other words, MNEs are expected to respect domestic laws, but at the same time they must do their best to respect the MNE Guidelineseven in cases of conflict between domestic laws and the guidelines' provisions. Adhering governments are encouraged to aid MNEs confronted with conflicting requirements by cooperating »in good faith with a view to resolving problems that may arise«.
172
The MNE Guidelines and Legislation on
Corporate Disclosure
In some instances, references to the MNE Guidelines are included in legislation about corporate disclosure. 173 An example is Directive 2014/ 95/EU regarding the disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (Directive on non-financial information). 174 The Directive on non-financial information stipulates that »large undertakings which are public-interest entities exceeding […] 500 employees […] shall include in the management report a non-financial statement containing information […] relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters«. 175 In addition, large enterprises are obliged to disclose their diversity policy in relation to administrative, management and supervisory bodies in their corporate governance statement.
176
When preparing their non-financial statement, large enterprises can make use of various international frameworks. The Directive on non-financial information specifically mentions the MNE Guidelines as one of the frameworks that can be used. The due-diligence provisions of the MNE Guidelines (see section 4.3.1) have inspired multiple sectoral due-diligence initiatives, as in the agricultural sector, 178 apparel and footwear industries 179 and the financial sector. 180 The due-diligence guidance provided for companies operating in supply chains of conflict minerals, the »OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas« (OECD due-diligence guidance), is somewhat older. 181 The OECD due-diligence guidance is drafted in such a manner that it builds on and is consistent with the MNE Guidelines.
182
Adhering states to the MNE Declaration were recommended by the Council to support, dissem-inate and actively promote observance of the OECD due-diligence guidance.
183
The OECD due-diligence guidance may be effectively transformed into hard law, since the Council of the European Union's approval of the European Commission's proposal for a regulation for »setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and highrisk areas« (EU conflict minerals regulation).
184
What is most striking, without going into the details, is that the requirements for responsible importers set forth by the proposed EU conflictminerals regulation are frequently based on the OECD due-diligence guidance. By requiring responsible importers to establish supply-chain policy standards and risk-management systems consistent with the OECD due-diligence guidance, among other requirements, the EU conflict-minerals regulation confers a hybrid status on the OECD due-diligence guidance and indirectly on the duediligence provisions of the MNE Guidelines on which the OECD due-diligence guidance is based.
185 Still, the MNE Guidelines and OECD due-diligence guidance remain legally non-binding, but the references to them in hard law draw them more into the legal realm.
The Road Ahead: The Customary Law Conundrum
The MNE Guidelines as Customary Law
An attempt has been made to bestow legal power on the MNE Guidelines through the cultivation of customary law. The classic theory of customary law was developed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the seminal »North Sea Continental Shelf cases«, the ICJ articulated two imperative criteria 186 to be fulfilled: 187 (i) the existence of an »extensive and virtually uniform« general practice amongst states and (ii) states feeling legally compelled to act in accordance with an obligatory rule of customary law (opinio juris).
188
In the first few years after the promulgation of the MNE Declaration, scholars opined that the MNE Guidelines could impossibly create international customary law instantly, but they might transform into customary law over time. 189 It was argued that, when applied frequently, the provisions of the MNE Guidelines could »pass into the general corpus of customary law« and could even apply to MNEs that had never accepted them. 190 This prophecy of a gradual evolution of customary law was maintained through the 1990s and into the new millennium.
191 By the mid1980s, the MNE Guidelines were already considered a general practice, given the length of time that they had been operative, 192 but they did not obtain the status of customary law and were instead expected to remain »in the limbo of not quite binding« for years to come.
193
The evolution of the MNE Guidelines into customary law has both been supported as well as opposed. Supporters of legally binding MNE Guidelines advance the view that the MNE Guidelines meet the requirements of customary law, because national governments enact legislation (general practice) and national courts decide (opinio juris) on matters they cover.
194 NCPs may play a critical role in creating international customary law as »the royal courts of this developing common law«.
195 Specific instances and their end products, NCP decisions, can develop a general practice and can serve as pathfinders for future, binding treaty rules, if necessary. 196 The follow-up procedures of the Investment Committee represent state practice by definition due to the inter-state discourse that takes place before a clarification, and it may also lead to the development of customary law.
197
argue that soft-law instruments, such as the MNE Guidelines, may influence state practice and »may result in the creation of an international customary law rule«.
198
Opponents purport that these types of claims of soft-law principles transforming into customary law could be problematic and have to be treated with caution. Some of them conclude that the MNE Guidelines have not yet developed into customary law. 199 In line with the reservations of Baade, 200 one of the first scholars to unveil the hidden difficulties underlying the development of customary law, opponents argue that the presence of state practice and opinio juris is not easily determined. The mere facts that the MNE Guidelines stipulate that they are voluntary, or that they were drafted as guidelines and not as articles to a legal convention, can indicate that no opinio juris and thus no rule of customary law has been established. 201 A further obstacle to accepting the MNE Guidelines as customary law is the dominant view that MNEs cannot be considered as subjects of international law. The dominant view was,
202
and still is, »state-centric«. 203 At best, MNEs could be considered as limited subjects of international law, for instance when such legal personality is conferred on MNEs in an international treaty.
204
Based on the aforementioned views of proponents and opponents on the development of the MNE Guidelines as customary law, no definitive answer can be given as to whether they have passed into the general corpus of customary law. No indication was found that these opposing views will reconcile in the near future, and no court decision was found that put an end to the discussion by establishing that the MNE Guidelines have transformed into customary law. In other words, the customary-law conundrum remains unresolved. Taking into account the voluntary nature of the MNE Guidelines and the state-centric view of international law, it is most likely that they cannot yet be considered customary law and that this will not change in the near future. While reaching a conclusion on the legal nature of NCPs is not very difficult because of their incorporation in the legally binding MNE Decision, reaching any tentative conclusion on the legal nature of the MNE Guidelines is very difficult indeed. The MNE Guidelines have always been kept in the limbo of »not quite binding«, and transformation of the MNE Guidelines into customary law seems unlikely for now. Proponents and opponents of this transformation have been unable to reconcile their views, and no court has decided this matter yet, leading to the conclusion that the customary-law conundrum is unresolved for now.
In conclusion, the MNE Guidelines contain voluntary recommendations and are not part of domestic or international law. As illustrated in the BATCO and Badger cases, the MNE Guidelines have fulfilled an auxiliary function when applied before a court of law and have also imposed obligations that transcend national laws. Matters covered by (inter)national rules and that are considered hard law are sometimes reflected in the MNE Guidelines, conferring a hybrid status on them. This hybrid status is exactly where the MNE Guidelines stand now: the guidelines do not constitute legal rules, but reflect matters that are covered by legal rules. On the one hand, some guidelines may be mere expressions of morality, which may impose moral obligations. On the other hand, developments, such as the incorporation of (parts of), or references to, the MNE Guidelines in EU Directive 2014/95 and the proposed EU conflict-minerals regulation indicate that the MNE Guidelines are possibly on the road to becoming hard law. However, multinormativity remains prevalent, and there may still be a long road ahead before they attain their legal status. Van, Willem Van Genugten (1997) , Mensenrechten in Gedragscodes voor het Internationale Bedrijfsleven, in: Ars Aequi 46,7/8, 500-505  Blanpain, Roger (1977) , The Badger Case and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Dordrecht  Blanpain, Roger (1980a) , The OECD Guidelines and Labour Relations. Badger and Beyond, in: Horn (1980a) 145-154  Blanpain, Roger (1980b) (1976, 1979, 1991, 2000, 2011) MNE Guidelines -OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976 Enterprises ( , 1979 Enterprises ( , 1991 Enterprises ( , 2000 Enterprises ( , 2011 NCP -National Contact Point NGO -non-governmental organisation OECD -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development EU confl ict minerals regulation -European Commission's proposal for a regulation for setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certifi cation of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in confl ict-aff ected and high-risk areas 
